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Article

The First Amendment on the Tracks:
Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?
Lillian R. BeViert
Every participant at this symposium is familiar with the
doctrinal disorder that is First Amendment jurisprudence.
Each of us has struggled to make sense of the myriad views
about the Amendment's objectives and the ultimate ends that it
serves or ought to serve. Each of us has tried to understand the
doctrines and to make them cohere, even as we have watched
them proliferate. And as the opinions multiplied and the number of issues on which the Justices agreed seemed constantly to
diminish, each of us must have wondered whether it made any
sense at all to talk or think about what "the Court" had decided
with respect to this or that controversy.
I doubt that I am the only participant who has observed
with feelings disturbingly akin to despair as First Amendment
theories have multiplied, the case law has become ever more
chaotic, and consensus on fundamental issues has remained
elusive both on and off the Court. Yet, despite the doctrinal and
scholarly cacophony, I would argue that, until quite recently, it
has been possible to identify several consistent aspects of First
Amendment jurisprudence and to articulate plausible rationales for them. In brief, they are as follows: First, the cases embodied a negative conception of the Amendment. First Amendment doctrine provided a shield that protected individuals from
government, not a sword that enabled them to prod it into action. Second, the cases offered more protection from regulation
for some categories of speech, and no protection at all for others. Despite protestations implying the contrary,1 the decisions
t John S. Shannon Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia Law
School. Copyright © 2005 by Lillian R. BeVier.
1. "But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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embodied an implicit hierarchy of value. Political speech received the most protection, 2 for example; commercial speech re5
4
ceived somewhat less;3 fighting words, child pornography, and

obscenity 6 supposedly received none at all; and entire speechregulating regimes--contract law, trade secret law, antitrust
law, for example--remained "totally untouched." 7 Third, much
First Amendment doctrine could be explained as an effort to
invalidate laws and official actions that betrayed a high risk of
having been motivated by the desire to punish unpopular
points of view, to control or manipulate public debate, or to
shield incumbent officeholders from criticism or challenge. In
other words, First Amendment doctrine has been much less
concerned with the effects of speech regulation-on speakers'
ability to communicate or listeners' ability to obtain information-than with illicit government purposes. Fourth, the distinction between content-based and content-neutral or nonspeech-related laws of general applicability served as the trigger for the level of scrutiny that the Court would apply.
That it is possible to discern these consistent features of
First Amendment doctrine does not mean that they reflect ei2. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) ("[I]t can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.");
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[here is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs.').
3. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976) (noting "commonsense differences" between commercial
and other forms of speech which justify a different, and lower, level of protection for the former).
4. According to the opinion in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
5. "There are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography
which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment." New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
6. "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
7. "Although the First Amendment refers to freedom of 'speech,' much
speech remains totally untouched by it." Frederick Schauer, The Boundariesof
the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1765 (2004).
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ther a normative or a theoretical consensus. Indeed, criticism
and calls for rethinking aspects of the doctrine, or for expanding its reach into previously unclaimed areas, relentlessly
emerge both from individual Justices and from members of the
legal academy. It is not often, however, that a sitting Justice
undertakes to propose-and to write opinions that attempt to
implement-a fundamental transformation of the Court's approach. Justice Stephen Breyer has announced his conviction
that such a transformation ought to take place. He has
sketched the underlying rationale of the transformation he advocates and outlined its contours, 8 and he has deployed it in
opinions. 9
In brief, Justice Breyer thinks existing doctrine is inadequate to realize his particular constitutional vision, principally
because it "puts too much weight on language, history, tradition, and precedent."'10 Regarding the consistent features of
First Amendment doctrine identified above, he rejects the
negative conception of the Amendment. Instead, he contends
that the doctrine sometimes empowers government to enact
legislation that restricts the speech of some citizens to "sustain
democratic self-government" and "achieve a workable democracy."" He has voted to sustain legislation motivated by a government purpose to manipulate public debate because the government defended the manipulation as an effort to "protect the
integrity of the political process."'12 He concluded that the legislature possessed a comparative institutional advantage and
therefore accepted the government's description of a statute's
purpose at face value. 13 Finally, Justice Breyer does not think
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations should dictate the level of scrutiny the Court
8. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
10. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 247.
11. Id. at 253.
12. See id.; see also Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[R]estrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral process-the
means through which a free society democratically translates political speech
into concrete governmental action.").
13. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I agree that the
legislature understands the problem-the threat to electoral integrity, the
need for democratization-better than do we.").
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should apply. 14 Although Justice Breyer has claimed that his
approach to constitutional interpretation generally, and to
First Amendment issues in particular, would 'lead judges to
consider the constitutionality of statutes with a certain modesty," 15 the fact is that his approach represents a sweeping departure from settled First Amendment doctrine and practice.
Whether the Court should embark on the course Justice
Breyer describes is a question that raises many issues that are
well beyond the scope of this symposium. Justice Breyer's approach would have immense systemic ramifications well beyond its implications for the First Amendment. A preliminary
assessment of some of those implications is, however, timely
and relevant, and this Article undertakes that task. This Article does not claim to occupy the high terrain of First Amendment theory; rather it stays close to the ground occupied by
doctrine and judicial methodology. It summarizes Justice
Breyer's approach as he outlined it in his 2001 Madison Lec16
ture at New York University Law School, and further looks at
several opinions in cases both before and after that lecture in
which he applied it.
Close analysis of opinions can be a tedious business, one
that at best risks inducing boredom, and at worst might be considered trivial or even irrelevant since legal realists have induced in all of us a pervasive distrust of the authenticity of the
articulated rationale of any judicial opinion. Of course, any single opinion is but one data point, which is hardly conclusive
evidence that an effort to provoke a seismic doctrinal or methodological shift has been mounted. One cannot get a sense of
the forest from looking at just one or even a few trees, which is
likely why so many commentators ordinarily tend to eschew
case parsing. I have chosen not to eschew it, however, because I
think something of a devil lurks in the details of the opinions I
will describe.
Justice Breyer has unambiguously announced his intention
to reshape First Amendment doctrine. The particular opinions

14. In his Bartnicki concurrence, for example, Justice Breyer would have
not used the strict scrutiny standard but would instead have looked at the
statute's "balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences" which is a matter of "proper fit." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536. In his
American Library Ass'n concurrence, he rejected strict scrutiny as "too limiting and rigid." Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring).
15. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 250.
16. See id. at 245.
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examined in this Article exemplify the approach he would have
the Court take. The moves he makes in them-the rationales
he offers, the precedents he cites or distinguishes or the ones he
simply ignores, the decision-making methodology he outlines,
and the rhetoric he invokes-are all moves that, were they to
become the norm, would cast First Amendment jurisprudence
adrift from its core of settled meaning and discard settled practices of First Amendment decision making.1 7 Whether one
views it with alarm or equanimity, however, Justice Breyer's
willingness to depart from settled doctrine and practice is
noteworthy. The stakes are high, and before endorsing Justice
Breyer's approach, it behooves us to identify what doing so
would entail.
I. THE CONSISTENCIES
Before turning to the opinions, a somewhat fuller account
is needed of the consistent aspects and interrelated rationales
of First Amendment jurisprudence that I discern in the cases.
This will clarify how different is the course that the Court has
been pursuing, albeit somewhat erratically, from the journey
upon which Justice Breyer would have it embark.
A. FREEDOM FROM: A NEGATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

First, the decided cases have consistently embodied a negative conception of the First Amendment, one that reflects the
concern of the Founders not "that government might do too lit-

17. Perhaps the normative implications of this fact are not troubling. Perhaps it is normatively appropriate to view the First Amendment, as Justice
Breyer apparently does, as "intrinsically, fundamentally, or even just largely
an artifact of a Constitution that is itself a common-law document," Frederick
Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 175, 197 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone
eds., 2002), one that neither guides nor constrains the Court's power. Perhaps
there is no reason to try "to make sense of the idea of the First Amendment
and free speech apart from what the courts have made of it," id., and perhaps,
therefore, we should consider the courts to be quite free to remake what they
have made of it from time to time, as the spirit moves them and their ideas
about it and the world change. But perhaps the First Amendment is law that
ought to be understood as antecedent to and thus binding upon the decisions
of the judges who apply it, law whose core is tolerably if not perfectly wellreflected in the doctrines and practices from which Justice Breyer would detach it. If this is so, then Justice Breyer's approach has considerably less normative appeal.
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tle for the people but that it might do too much to them."' 8 The
negative conception means two things. First, it means that the
Amendment is a shield, not a sword. It gives citizens neither
positive rights against government' 9 nor affirmative claims to
government resources. Second, it means that the Amendment
limits government's power rather than enlarging it.
The public forum doctrine is the only significant exception
to the consistent view that the Amendment does not give citizens affirmative claims to government's resources. This doctrine grants citizens the right of access for speech to streets and
parks which have "time out of mind.., been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." 20 Despite the well-entrenched nature of the public forum doctrine, its First Amendment roots
are surprisingly obscure. Moreover, litigants and academic
commentators have not succeeded in persuading the Court to
grant First Amendment rights of access to other publicly owned
property, 21 despite their arguments that doing so 22would enhance both the quality and quantity of public debate.
The single exception to the negative conception as a limit
on, rather than an enhancement of, government power is Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.23 In Red Lion, the Court sus-

tained, as applied to broadcasters, the FCC-promulgated fairness doctrine and its personal attack rules. The rhetoric of Justice White's majority opinion seemed to endorse the view that
the First Amendment empowers government to regulate speech
to enhance the quality of public debate. It did this despite the
18. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984), quoted in David P. Currie, Positive and
Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 864 (1986).
19. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (holding that the Amendment
does not impose an affirmative duty on the government to make sources of information available to journalists that are not available to the general public);
Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (same).
20. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
21. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, RehabilitatingPublic Forum Doctrine:
In Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79 (describing the uncertainty of
the Court's position on the issue in light of the contradictory holdings in recent
cases).
22. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, ForaAmericana: Speech in Public Places,
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233 (claiming that Court decisions threatened expressive
liberty contained in the First Amendment); Note, The Public Forum: Minimum
Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975)
(advocating an expansive "public forum" concept of speech).
23. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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absence of discernible criteria with which to evaluate the effects of the regulations. Thus the questions remained of how
the government was to determine whether the regulations were
successful at protecting the right of the "public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas," 24 and whether they actually served their "goal of pro25
ducing an informed public."

The conception of the First Amendment as empowering
government to regulate speech in the name of fairness or of a
more informed public debate gained no traction in cases that
arose outside the context of broadcast regulation. Moreover, in
that context, the result in Red Lion itself came to be justified by
spectrum scarcity, not as a vindication of the rights of viewers
and listeners or as an enhancement of their freedom. 26 Indeed,
when confronted with the print analogue of the personal attack
rules-a Florida statute requiring newspapers to offer reply
space to candidates whose opponents the papers endorsed-the
Court, without even citing Red Lion, unequivocally rejected it.27
The point is that Red Lion has had virtually no impact on First
Amendment doctrine outside of broadcast regulation.
Surprisingly, however, Red Lion is often invoked by commentators who assert that the First Amendment empowers
government to regulate the media to "promote... a wellfunctioning democratic regime." 28 Cass Sunstein, for example,
has asserted that far from being an isolated example that arose
in a unique context, Red Lion represents the culmination of a
"free speech tradition" focused on public deliberation and toleration of "governmental efforts to encourage diverse views and

24. Id. at 390.
25. Id. at 392. In fact, the FCC eventually concluded, and in Syracuse
Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1019 (1990), the D.C. Circuit Court sustained the conclusion that
the fairness doctrine in operation disserves both the public's right to
diverse sources of information and the broadcaster's interest in free
expression. Its chilling effect thwarts its intended purpose, and it results in excessive and unnecessary government intervention into the
editorial processes of broadcast journalists.
Id.
26. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (suggesting that the holding in Red Lion "rests upon the unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium").
27. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
28. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT 178 (1999).
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attention to public issues."29 In the legal academy, there is considerable support for the view that the First Amendment does
not so much guarantee freedom from government as it implements values such as democratic deliberation and political
equality. On this view, it becomes intelligible to say that there
can be First Amendment interests on both sides of a controversy about a regulation of speech.30 Until Justice Breyer's arrival on the Court, however, no Justice had consistently championed these arguments, and the results of the cases make
clear that the Court had rejected them.
B. A HIERARCHY OF PROTECTION, WITH POLITICAL SPEECH AT
THE TOP
Before the Court's extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech in 1976,31 the overwhelming majority
of First Amendment cases involved attempts to regulate speech
that was in one way or another speech about government.
These regulations generally concerned either speech specifically about candidates or officials, speech about issues on the
public agenda, or speech generally criticizing our form of government and advocating its overthrow. As the Court noted in
1966, "there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs." 32 Three of the most canonical First
33
Amendment cases-Brandenburgv. Ohio, New York Times v.
34
political
and Cohen v. California35-involve
Sullivan,
36
Together the cases embody several strategies, both
speech.
doctrinal 37 and rhetorical, 38 that the Court has developed for
29. Id. at

176.

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987).
31. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
32. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
33. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
30.

34.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

35. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
36. Brandenburg involved a conviction under a criminal syndicalism statute which punished advocacy of crime or violence as a means of accomplishing
political reform; New York Times v. Sullivan involved defamation of a public
official, and the Court characterized the imposition of damages as the equivalent of punishment for seditious libel; and Cohen involved a crude statement of
disaffection for American military policy.
37. Brandenburg,for example, fashioned the broad and deliberately overprotective rule that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
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protecting such speech. The Court has brought neither these
strategies nor their rhetorical embellishments to bear on cases
invalidating regulations of other kinds of speech, such as commercial speech or virtual child pornography. The implication of
the famous Mosley dictum--"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content" 39 -is that all categories of speech are entitled to
equivalent First Amendment protection. In case after case,
however, the Court neither cited nor followed this dictum, thus
contradicting that implication. 40 These results seem wise, for
"[n]o sensible approach to first amendment questions can dispense with ... [the] hierarchy" 4 1 of values that a broad rule

press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force.., except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S.
at 447. New York Times fashioned a different, though similarly overprotective, rule that "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at
279.
38. In New York Times, Justice Brennan uttered one of the most cherished and frequently invoked rhetorical tributes to the First Amendment of
modern times, namely his reference to "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." 376 U.S. at 270. Justice Harlan in Cohen issued a memorable rhetorical tribute:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion,
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise
of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.
403 U.S. at 24.
39. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
40. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(permitting locality to prohibit adult motion picture theatres, but not other
theatres, from locating near residential zones, churches, or schools); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (sustaining FCC authority to channel to
certain hours radio broadcast of sexually explicit speech (George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" monologue), but not other speech); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (permitting localities to exercise zoning powers so
as to cluster movie theatres featuring adult content but not other theatres);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (permitting municipality to forbid political advertising but not other advertising on city buses).
41. Paul B. Stephan, III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 206 (1982).
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that the First Amendment is neutral as between categories
would reject, nor would it be sensible to see the equivalent First
Amendment risk in every legislative regulation of the mere act
of speaking. Treating all regulations of speech the same regardless of category also carries the significant and worrisome potential to purchase breadth of protection at the cost of depth
and strength and to lessen the protection from regulations of
"speech that matters." This is the one consistent aspect of First
Amendment doctrine that Justice Breyer's approach would not
reject. 42
C. BAD MOTIVES
The Court has often celebrated the intrinsic value of
speakers communicating or audiences receiving information.
This is evident in the Court's frequent invocation of the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate in New
York Times v. Sullivan;43 in the overbreadth doctrine, which
invalidates laws that deter too much speech; 44 and in the
Court's insistence, when engaging in strict scrutiny, that Congress choose the least restrictive means to achieve admittedly
legitimate goals. 45 These features may suggest that the Court
has crafted First Amendment law to maximize the quantity of
public debate so that speakers could communicate more and
listeners would have more to hear. 46 Neither the results of the
cases nor the doctrines that the Court invokes, however, lend
themselves to this explanation. 4 7 Instead, they support an in42. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 245.
43. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
44. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973) ("Mhe First
Amendment needs breathing space and.., statutes attempting to restrict or
burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn.").
45. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755
(1996) (applying least restrictive means test to strike down sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act); Sable Comms. of
Calif., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government may, however,
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
46. And sometimes, too, it has seemed as though the Court thought that it
was important to protect speech "as such" from regulation, as though the "fortuitous presence of words"--in one of Frederick Schauer's felicitous phrasesitself created something like a presumption of constitutionality. Schauer, supranote 17, at 180.
47. See BeVier, supra note 21, at 102-12 (suggesting the various public
forum theories utilized in the First Amendment debate generally ignore the
problem of suppressing the quantity of free speech).
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terpretation that regards the search for illicit government motives as the driving force behind nearly the whole body of First
Amendment doctrine, especially insofar as it has to do with political speech. In other words, many of the cases can be explained as a first-order prohibition of restrictions on speech
that bear evidence of having stemmed "from hostility [to the
speaker's viewpoint], sympathy [for the majority's point of
view], or self-interest [of government actors]."48 This prohibition is backed, because illicit motives are so easy to disguise
and so difficult to detect, by a body of second-order rules de49
signed to flush them out.
Understood from this perspective, First Amendment rules,
which "use objective criteria, focusing on what a law includes
and excludes, on what classifications it uses, on how it is written," can be seen as proxies for the direct inquiry into motive
that the Court could not productively undertake. 50 Also, understood from this perspective, First Amendment doctrines and
methodologies-such as strict scrutiny of content-based regulations-do not reflect the view that the Court has a systematic
comparative advantage at making the policy determinations
that must be made to evaluate either the importance of the
government's interest or the precision of its chosen means. Instead, they reflect the kind of strategy that is necessary in this
second-best world-a strategy for determining whether the

48. Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, PublicPurpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 441-42 (1996).
49.

Id.

See

generally

FREDERICK

SCHAUER,

FREE

SPEECH,

A

PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 80-86 (1982) (discussing heightened danger of illicit
motive as one factor to be considered in defense of greater protection for
speech than for other forms of conduct); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 227-33 (1983) (discussing concern with illicit motive as a significant factor explaining the content-based/content-neutral distinction in First Amendment law); cf. Ronald A.
Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: ConstitutionalInterpretationand Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1443-49 (1987) (explaining the worries that prompted the framers to protect speech and press
had much to do with the desire to prevent speech regulations that were motivated by the personal interests of official regulators).
50. Kagan, supra note 48, at 441. Dean Kagan continues: "The principle is
that the First Amendment bans .. , hostility, sympathy, or self-interest. The
fact is that courts cannot enforce this ban directly." Id. at 441-42. It is because
the Court could not productively undertake a direct inquiry into motive that
the explanation of First Amendment doctrine as an effort to discern illicitly
motivated legislation is persuasive despite the Court's insistence that it "will
not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged
illicit legislative motive." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
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government interests asserted in behalf of legislation are subterfuges for illicit government motives that would otherwise go
undetected. 51
The concern with bad governmental motives turns out to
be of a piece with the negative, freedom from, conception of the
First Amendment. Both are consistent with the view that representative democracy, with regularly scheduled elections in
which citizens discuss candidates and policies and hold elected
officials to account, is unthinkable unless citizens are free to
criticize government and to express political views without fear
of government retribution. 52 If we think about representative
democracy in terms of an agency theory heuristic that regards
citizens as principals and elected officials as their agents, 53 we
can understand that achieving the central aspiration of representative democracy-"government of the people, by the people,
and for the people"-is both dauntingly complex and profoundly
challenging. 54 In a nutshell, the basic problem to be solved is
that of "agency slippage," which occurs because
the interests of the principals diverge from the interests of their
agents .... The agents have an incentive to engage in self-dealing;
the principals have an incentive to try to rein them in ....

51. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1 passim (1989) (discussing generally why we have a series of
First Amendment rules that are not simply direct applications of the background principles or justifications for freedom of speech).
52. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23 (1971) (noting that representative democracy is "a
form of government that would be meaningless without freedom to discuss
government and its policies').
53. As Steven Calabresi has pointed out, there are "a whole host of noncontractualagency relationships that exist in the political system." Steven G.
Calabresi, PoliticalPartiesas Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479,
1523 (1994). These include, in addition to the relationship of voters to elected
officials, the agency relationship of the president to officials in the executive
branch, the agency relationship of the leaders of the legislative and judicial
branches to their subordinates, and the agency relationship between congressional committee chairmen and the executive branch officials whom they oversee and who are charged with responsibility of enforcing the legislation that
Congress enacts. Id. at 1423-24.
54. For an application of agency cost theory to democratic government, see
Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to ConstitutionalTheory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471
(1988).
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[The theory of constitutional, democratic governance must wrestle with the problem of agency costs just as corporations must wrestle
with it.55

Regularly scheduled elections and public debate free from
government manipulation or control are important means of
preventing agency slippage: Elections are the formal mechanism by which citizens hold their representatives accountable, 56 and the political debate that the First Amendment protects is the forum for the exchange of facts and opinions about
what candidates have done and will do if elected. Citizens decide how to vote based, not wholly, perhaps, but in some large
measure, on the content of political debate. Collective action
problems plague citizen principals' efforts to monitor their
elected official agents. 57 Because these problems make effective
citizen monitoring so problematic, it is all too easy for elected
officials to shirk their duty to act in the interest of their constituent citizen principals and to pursue their own self-interest
instead. Unfortunately, the risk that they will do so is deeply
and systemically embedded in our complex modern democracy.
We can never hope to eliminate it entirely; the best we can do is
be alert to it, and try to reduce it.
Elected officials inevitably face the temptation to entrench
themselves in power by manipulating public debate to discriminate against unpopular viewpoints or effectively suppress
criticism of themselves; 58 the "ins have a way of wanting to
make sure the outs stay out."59 Common sense suggests that

55. Calabresi, supra note 53, at 1525.
56. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1646-49 (1999) (noting that, in large part because there are few legal means to ensure agent loyalty, elections are the principal means by which voters regulate their representatives' behavior); see also
Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on
Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 369, 370 (1989) (describ-

ing mechanism by which "competitive elections reduce the incidence of shirking" by agents).

57. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1274 (1994) (noting

that "[ijndividual voters have little incentive to acquire information about the
behavior of [those who represent them]").

58. See Cass, supra note 49, at 1454 (noting that in the context of the general argument that the framers of the First Amendment were trying to prevent recurrence of problems that had already arisen, noting that they were
familiar with-and wished to prevent-a system of press licensing because it
had served as a "vehicle for self-interested suppression of criticism of public
officials").
59. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
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the more successful they are at doing this, the more costly and
difficult they will make it for citizens to monitor and hold them
accountable when they shirk their duties. A central challenge
of representative democracy is the need to minimize the opportunities for agency slippage. That elected officials are likely to
yield to systematic temptations to regulate speech to their
benefit exacerbates the difficulty of preventing agency slippage.
These realities provide a key justification for embracing the
negative conception of the First Amendment-for regarding the
amendment as limiting, rather than enhancing, government
power to regulate public debate and for crafting First Amendment doctrines that seek to detect the wolf of illicit motivation
even when it wears the sheep's clothing of reform.
D. THE CONTENT-BASED/CONTENT-NEUTRAL DISTINCTION

For First Amendment cases that do not arise in a context
in which the Amendment's distinct categorical rules apply, the
Court determines the standard of review according to whether
the law at issue is content based or content neutral. Although
the decision of which standard to apply is not supposed to be a
decision on the merits, the decision is of pivotal importance in
First Amendment cases because it is almost always outcomedeterminative. 60 Strict scrutiny is almost always "fatal in
fact," 61 while intermediate scrutiny has become the practical

equivalent of lenient, rational basis review. 62 The application of
the content-based/content-neutral test can yield problematic
results, 63 but the standard for making the determination is
REVIEW 106 (1980).
60. But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-211 (1992) (claiming to
apply strict scrutiny but sustaining a Tennessee law establishing a campaignfree zone).
61. Gerald Gunther was the first to use this locution; he did so in the context of an analysis of "new" and "old" equal protection. See Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 923-26 (1993)
(suggesting that any speech protective force that there might have been in the
review of incidental restrictions of speech has been "eviscerated" by recent
cases); Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of
Incidental Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 788
(1985) (stating that the intermediate scrutiny that the Court gives to incidental restrictions on speech "has resembled rational basis review").
63. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994)
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well-settled in principle (if it is not oxymoronic to talk about
standards "in principle"): "[L]aws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the
ideas or views expressed are content-based," 64 but "government
regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it
is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."' 65 The Court will sustain content-based laws only if
they serve a compelling state interest using the least restrictive
means. Content-neutral laws that do not regulate or punish expression on the basis of its ideas or its viewpoint, and that are
not justified with reference to the content of speech, receive
only intermediate scrutiny. In other words, even if a contentneutral law restricts expression as applied in a particular case,
the Court will sustain the law if "it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 66
The use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction as
a trigger for the level of scrutiny is entrenched in First
Amendment doctrine. Like everything else about First
Amendment jurisprudence, it has its detractors. 67 Still, like the
negative conception, the priority given to political speech, and
the search for illicit government motives, the distinction has a
discernible and defensible rationale. 68 Indeed, its justification
builds upon the insights embodied in those consistent aspects
of the doctrine. Laws aimed directly at the content of speech or
at the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints warrant
strict scrutiny because their very terms indicate that they are
the product of deliberate legislative attempt to manipulate or
distort debate.

(Kennedy, J.) (must-carry provisions content neutral); id. at 676 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (must-carry provisions content based).
64. Id.
65. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal cita-

tion omitted).
66. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First

Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 655-63 (1991) (advocating strict scrutiny

for content-neutral laws that have significant content-based effects).
68. The most thorough examination of the content-based/content-neutral
distinction and its rationale remains Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
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On their face, content-based laws suggest that they may
have been motivated by government hostility to, or sympathy
for, particular viewpoints or by the self-interest of incumbent
government actors may have materialized. On the other hand,
laws that do not aim at expression, treat all speech the same
regardless of its content or its point of view, or advance government interests that do not turn on an expression's content
or its point of view are "relatively poor tools for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a substantial political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome." 69 Because such laws do not carry a substantial risk of
illicit motivation, the search for bad government motives provides scant justification for the Court to review strictly their
asserted ends and chosen means. In addition, a commitment to
strict scrutiny of such laws would entail frequent and intrusive
70
judicial scrutiny of a large number of legislative actions, scrutiny with no criteria to guide it since we lack a metric for judging whether asserted government interests are indeed "compelling," the chosen means adequately "narrow."
Of course laws that are content neutral in purpose are not,
71
by virtue of that fact, content-neutral in effect. They will inevitably and predictably have effects on the kind and amount of
speech that occurs, although the exact nature and extent of
such effects is unlikely to be either predictable ex ante or discernible ex post. In other words, content-neutral laws undeniably "affect what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what
effect." 72 All laws do. But not all laws carry the risk of having
been motivated by hostility or favoritism toward particular
points of view, or by an effort to manipulate debate or to protect
incumbent politicians.
Precisely because the speech effects of content-neutral laws
are difficult to discern ex post and unpredictable ex ante, they
carry slight risk of having been illicitly motivated. It is the risk
of illicit motivation, however, that justifies the Court's attempt
in First Amendment cases to evaluate content-based statutes'
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Kagan, supra note 48, at 452, 496.
70. See Schauer, supra note 62, at 784 ('To be concerned significantly, in a
constitutional sense, with incidental effects [of content-neutral laws] is to be
committed to judicial scrutiny of an enormous range of government decisions.").
71. For a persuasive and thorough demonstration of this point, see Alexander, supra note 62, passim.
72. Id. at 929 (emphasis omitted).
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ends and means, not some claim that the Court possesses the
wisdom to assess the compellingness of the government's needs
or that it has managed to identify constitutional criteria that
would permit it to determine in the case of every law whether
its effect on speech is "too substantial" to be tolerated.
Strict scrutiny of content-based laws is a proxy for the hunt
for illicit government motives. It is best understood not as a
claim of judicial omniscience but "as an evidentiary device that
allows the government to disprove the implication of improper
motive arising from the content-based terms of a law." 73 A

proxy is needed because illicit motives are too easily disguised
by pretextual purposes. Where there is little reason to suspect
the presence of illicit motives, as there is with content-neutral
laws, there is little justification for strict scrutiny.7 4
II. JUSTICE BREYER'S APPROACH: A DESCRIPTION

A. THE MADISON LECTURE
In his Madison Lecture at New York University Law
School, Justice Breyer invoked the nineteenth-century French
political philosopher Benjamin Constant, whose ideas about the
people's right to "'an active and constant participation in collective power"' 75 he found persuasive and relevant to the interpretation of our Constitution today. Justice Breyer argued that
"increased recognition of the Constitution's general democratic
participatory objectives"76-a project he described as protecting
"active liberty" 77-- can help courts "deal more effectively
with a
73.

Kagan, supra note 48, at 453.

74. Parenthetically, there is reason to doubt that genuine First Amendment gains would be achieved by case-by-case strict scrutiny of the speech effects wrought by content-neutral laws. Such a practice would be costly but
most laws would likely pass muster. Id. at 495. Moreover, the benefits of judicial review are subject to the law of diminishing returns. "[T]here comes a
point at which the capacity to control government abuse diminishes, while the
gains from controlling [it] are small. Then it is time to quit .... Richard A.
Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARv. L. REV. 5, 57 (1988).
75.

See Breyer, supra note 8, at 246 (citing Benjamin Constant, The Lib-

erty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns (1819), in POLITICAL
WRITINGs 309, 316 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed., 1988)).
76. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 250.
77. Id. at 246. Breyer acknowledges that his concept of "active liberty" has
much in common with Isaiah Berlin's conception of "positive liberty." Id. at
246 n.9; see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Inaugural Lecture Before
the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
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78
range of specific constitutional issues." He discussed the implication of these ideas for general issues of constitutional interpretation and for several specific issues, including the First
Amendment.
Justice Breyer's First Amendment discussion illustrated
how his approach would work with regard to campaign finance
restrictions and other First Amendment problems, such as economic and workplace regulation. Regarding campaign finance,
he stated his unequivocal view that the goal of protecting active
liberty "is not simply one of protecting the individual's 'nega79
tive' freedom from governmental restraint." The Amendment
"helps to sustain the democratic process" not simply by guaranteeing political freedom but by actively "encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral decisions and
by encouraging an exchange of views among ordinary citizens
necessary to their informed participation in the electoral proc81
ess."8 0 Campaign finance laws "further the latter objective."
Their lofty goal, he said, is

to democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the
electoral process, thereby building public confidence in that process,
financial support,
broadening the base of a candidate's meaningful
82
and encouraging greater public participation.

Justice Breyer exhibited no concerns about the possibility
that campaign finance regulations might be motivated by less
admirable ends, such as protecting incumbent officeholders
from successful challenge. 83 Instead, he stated that the Court
owed a large degree of deference to such regulations because
they embody the legislature's answers regarding "empirical
84
matters about which [it] is comparatively expert." Justice
Breyer insisted that there are important First Amendment interests on both sides of the debate about campaign finance
regulation. He regards the First Amendment as both a source
118-72 (1969).
78. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 250.
79. Id. at 252.
80. Id. at 253.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on
the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045
(1985).
84. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 254. Justice Breyer failed to consider the
ironic possibility that, if incumbent protection were in fact the motivation for
the regulations, the legislators would indeed be the ones who would know best

how to manipulate the regulation of political activity so as to accomplish it.
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of and a limit on the power of legislatures to enact such laws,
and for this reason would reject strict scrutiny of them in principle. A "First Amendment presumption hostile to government
regulation [of campaign finance practices] ... is... out of
place."8 5 Instead, the basic question that such regulations raise

is
one of proportionality. Do the statutes strike a reasonable balance be-

tween their electoral speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences? Or do they instead impose restrictions on that speech that
are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding
electoral and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind,
the importance, and the extent of those benefits, as well as the need
for the restrictions in order to secure them? 86

Turning to other kinds of First Amendment problems,
where there are not First Amendment interests on both sides,
Justice Breyer claimed that good reasons exist for the Court to
make distinctions between categories of regulation. "[S]pecial,

strong, pro-speech judicial presumptions" 8 7 should apply to
laws restricting "speech that takes place in areas related to
politics and policymaking by elected officials"8 8 but not where
"ordinary commercial or economic regulation is at
issue."8 9
Were "strong speech protection.., applied to all governmental
efforts to control speech," 90 the public's ability to make "economic and social choices," 91 especially with regard to workplace
regulation, would be unduly limited. But the legislature is not
"home free"92 to enact commercial speech or other economic
regulations at will. The Court must be alert to monitor any
possibly untoward effects of laws affecting kinds of speech
other than those related to politics and policymaking by elected
93
officials.
As is plain from this brief summary, Justice Breyer's approach to the First Amendment self-consciously and explicitly
departs from the approach that contemporary First Amendment doctrines embody. It would not necessarily dictate that
the Court overrule all of its past cases. It would, however, re85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 253.
at 256.

at 255.
at 256.
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quire the Court to reconsider them, and would sanction adhering only to those "precedents" with which, using his approach,
94
the Justices found themselves in agreement. It bears repeating that, with the single exception that he would continue to
give-and would acknowledge that he was giving-primacy to
political speech, Justice Breyer's approach would dictate the
abandonment of the consistent features of First Amendment
doctrine identified earlier. He rejects both the underlying rationales of these doctrinal regularities and the decision-making
processes that they dictate. I turn now to see how the approach
has worked in several opinions in which he has applied it.
B. THE OPINIONS

1. Turner BroadcastingSystems v. FCC
This section begins with three cases that arose shortly before the occasion of the Madison Lecture prompted Justice
Breyer to crystallize his thoughts and articulate a rationale for
his evolving approach. The first case is Turner Broadcasting v.
FCC (Turner I1),95 in which the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny to sustain the content-neutral "must-carry" provisions
of the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 (Cable Act). 96 Turner II is the first case in which Justice
Breyer adumbrated his inclination to reject the negative conception of the First Amendment, and he had to go a bit out of
his way to do so. The must-carry provisions required cable operators to dedicate some channels to local broadcast television
stations. 97 Cable operators argued that the provisions violated
the First Amendment because they required operators to carry
speech they might otherwise choose to exclude. The Court rejected this challenge and repeated its description from Turner I
94.

The scare quotes in text are prompted by Professor Schauer's insight

that the way arguments from precedent usually work in law is to constrain
decision makers to "give weight to a particular result regardless of whether
that decisionmaker believes it to be correct and regardless of whether that decisionmaker believes it valuable in any way to rely on that previous result."
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987). In other
words, the text implies that Justice Breyer really does not adhere to precedent
as it is commonly understood in legal argument.
95. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
96. Id. at 213-14.
97. The Court in Turner I had determined that the must-carry requirements were content neutral. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512
U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
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of the interests that the Cable Act allegedly advanced. The
Court held that the Act sufficiently served
three interrelated interests: (1) preserving the benefits of free, overthe-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television programming.98

Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and joined the
Court's opinion "except insofar as [it] relies on an anticompetitive rationale."9 9 He thought the Cable Act's objectives of preserving the benefits of free local television and promoting dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources were
alone sufficient to sustain it without regard to any competitionpromoting purpose it might or might not serve. 100 Though he
conceded that the must-carry provision "extracts a serious First
Amendment price"'101 from the cable operators, he insisted that
the government's interest in promoting dissemination from a
wide variety of sources was an interest that the First Amendment empowered the government to pursue through regulation.
To evaluate the must-carry provisions, the majority in Turner
II used the O'Brien102 test, which does not reflect the judgment
that the reason intermediate scrutiny is appropriate is that
there are First Amendment interests "on both sides." Justice
Breyer claimed to agree that the Court had used the correct
test. 10 3 In other words, he described himself as applying
O'Brien. In fact, however, he articulated an inquiry quite different from O'Brien. He presaged the approach later outlined in
his Madison Lecture:
With important First Amendment interests on both sides of the
equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit. That question.., requires a reviewing court to determine both whether there
are significantly less restrictive ways to achieve Congress' over-theair programming objectives, and also to decide whether the statute, in
its effort to achieve those objectives, strikes a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting and speech-enhancing conse104
quences.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
66 and
103.
104.

Id. at 662, quoted in Turner II, 520 U.S at 189.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also supra note
accompanying text.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225-26 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 227.
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2. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
A second case decided before the Madison Lecture was
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC.1°5 In Nixon, the
Court relied on the authority of Buckley v. Valeo to sustain
Missouri's stringent restrictions on contributions to candidates
for state office. 106 Justice Breyer felt compelled to write a concurring opinion to "address the critical question of how the
Court ought to review this kind of problem."' 0 7 He insisted that
the case was one in which "constitutionally protected interests
lie on both sides of the legal equation."' 0 8 This time, however,
the First Amendment interest he thought the statute promoted
was not the Turner II interest of facilitating public discussion
and informed deliberation. Rather, the interests were "protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral process,"'1 9 and "encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the
First Amendment itself presupposes."' 10 He claimed to apply
the Buckley analysis that the Court had consistently claimed to
deploy"' in campaign finance cases. Nevertheless, because he
thought the First Amendment both empowered the government
to restrict speech to protect the integrity of the democratic
process and limited its authority to regulate speech, he insisted
that strict scrutiny of the Missouri statute was inappropriate."12
In his Nixon concurrence, Justice Breyer outlined the proportionality approach that he later explicitly endorsed in his
Madison Lecture. He insisted that this approach was "consistent with the approach this Court has taken in many complex
First Amendment cases." 113 It is difficult to give this claim
much credence since any case in the corpus of First Amendment jurisprudence might be deemed "complex," and none of
the cases he cited as illustrating the approach the "Court has
taken"-nor indeed any First Amendment case of which I am

105.

528 U.S. 377 (2000).

106. See id. at 382.
107. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).

108. Id.
109. Id. at 401.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 401-05. Although the Court has consistently cited Buckley,
it has applied it very inconsistently. See Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v FEC:
Not Senator Buckley's FirstAmendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 129-31 (2004).
112. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 401-02.
113. Id. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring).

1302

MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW

[89:1280

aware---contains any reference at all to "proportionality."'" 14

Further, of the cases he cited, only Red Lion came anywhere
close to affirming that the "First Amendment permits the [government] to restrict the speech of some to enable the speech of
others." 115 In particular, he insisted that Red Lion was consistent with Buckley, although this required him to read Buckley
in a rather odd way. He recognized that Buckley itself reflected
a presumption against the constitutionality of such restrictions, 116 but he asserted that its unequivocal rejection of "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others"'117 simply could not "be taken literally."" l8
His explanation later in the opinion of his assertion that
Buckley "might be interpreted as embodying sufficient flexibility for the problem at hand ' 119 makes it clear that he was, at
best, stretching the concept of interpretation to the breaking
point. Buckley, he claimed, "seems to leave the political
branches broad authority to enact laws regulating contributions" of soft money. 120 Until McConnell v.FEC,121 however,

114. Justice Breyer cited a hodgepodge of cases in support of his assertion
that "where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected
interests in complex ways-the Court has closely scrutinized the statute's impact on those interests, but refrained from employing a simple test." Id. at
402. For example, he cited Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), and claimed
that in it the Court "balanc[ed] the rights of privacy and expression." See
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring). In Frisby, however, the Court
explicitly described itself as applying its customary standard of review to the
content-neutral regulation of speech in a traditional public forum that was at
issue in that case. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 481 (explaining that the State may enforce time, place, and manner regulations, "which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication") (citations omitted). For another example, he cited Rowan v. Post Office
Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), again claiming that it balanced the rights of
privacy and expression. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Rowan, however, is more easily explained as an affirmation of a more categorical principle, to the effect that "[n]othing in the Constitution compels us to
listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit." Rowan,
397 U.S. at 737. Certainly the Court thought of itself as deciding in categorical
terms, for it explicitly said that it "categorically reject[ed] the argument that a
vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another." Id. at 738.
115. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 401-02.
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
118. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 404.
120. Id.
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there was a substantial amount of controversy about precisely
that issue. 122 Further, although he noted that Buckley upheld
public financing laws, 123 Justice Breyer failed to note that the
law at issue in Buckley did not require presidential candidates
to accept public financing but merely permitted the government
to make candidates choose between accepting public money and
foregoing private funding or foregoing public funding.
Justice Breyer's concluding paragraph, however, betrayed
his fundamental disagreement with Buckley. He stated that, if
he were wrong about Buckley, that is if Buckley "denies the political branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive solutions to the problems posed by campaign finance... I believe
'
the Constitution would require us to reconsider [it]. "124 Although Justice Breyer suggested that concern over campaign
finance laws might arise were there evidence that the effect of
the contribution limits was to "insulate ... legislators from effective electoral challenge."'125 Apparently, he saw no reason to
think that the statute embodied such a systemic risk of the legislature's having harbored an incumbent protective motive that
strict scrutiny might have been warranted.
3. Bartnicki v. Vopper
126
State
Next consider the 2001 case Bartnicki v. Vopper.
and federal wiretap statutes make wiretapping by both law enforcement officials and private individuals illegal. To deter it,
the statutes provide civil and criminal penalties against any
person, whether or not implicated in the interception, who discloses the contents of a conversation knowing that it was illegally intercepted. The latter provision was at issue in Bartnicki. A radio talk show host disclosed the contents of the tape
1 27
He knew that the
of an illegally intercepted conversation.
conversation had been illegally intercepted but had not himself

121.

540 U.S. 93 (2003).

122. For a summary of arguments that Buckley required strict scrutiny of
soft money contributions, see BeVier, supra note 83.
123. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 404 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 405.
125. Id. at 404.
126. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In his Madison Lecture, Justice Breyer discussed
Bartnicki not in the context of his First Amendment discussion but rather in
the context of a discussion of "current threats to the protection of privacy."
Breyer, supra note 8, at 261.
127. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
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participated in the interception.128 As permitted by provisions
of both the federal and applicable state statutes, the two participants in the conversation sued the radio host for damages
based on the disclosure. 29 In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
Court held that the statutory provisions providing for damages
for the disclosure were unconstitutional as applied. 130 Justice
Breyer wrote a concurring opinion.
The majority's impulse to protect the disclosure in Bartnicki obviously stemmed from the tape's content, for it revealed
the plaintiffs to have been contemplating an alarming course of
action. The plaintiffs were teachers' union officials, and their
conversation was about strategy for their ongoing salary negotiations with the school board, which were apparently not going
well from their point of view.1 3 ' The tape revealed one saying,
"If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have
to go to their, their homes... To blow off their front porches,
we'll have to do some work on some of those guys. (PAUSES).
Really, uh, really and truthfully because this is, you know, this

is bad news

... "132

Nevertheless, the decision to protect the disclosure does
not represent either the application or the natural progression
of the relevant First Amendment doctrines. The wiretap statutes were content-neutral laws of general application. Their
purpose was, without question, solely to protect the privacy of
telephone communications; no one doubted it. No reason existed to suspect the legitimacy or sincerity of the motives of the
legislature that had enacted the statutes. Thus, the statutes'
application to the disclosures in Bartnicki should have been
subjected to intermediate scrutiny, not to the strict scrutiny
that the Court actually employed. Had this been done, they
would surely have passed First Amendment muster.
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court requires extended
analysis, though that is not my present task. Suffice it to note
that, although Justice Stevens acknowledged their content neutrality, he described the disclosure provisions as "regulation[s]
of pure speech."' 133 He then proceeded to review them as though
the First Amendment protects from regulation words for their
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 517-18.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted).
See id. at 526.
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own sake, without regard to whether their regulation risks singling out particular speakers or particular points of view, or
has the systematic potential to distort debate or to protect incumbent politicians from challenge. Employing strict scrutiny,
Justice Stevens concluded that the defendants' receipt of the
34
illegally intercepted communication was not itself unlawful
and the government could not empirically support its asserted
interest in drying up the market for illegally intercepted communications. Moreover, he held that, while strong, the government's interest in protecting private communications from the
chilling effect of the fear of disclosure was not strong enough to
prevail against "the interest in publishing matters of public
35

importance."1

Justice Breyer's concurring opinion claimed to join the
Court's opinion. Similar to his Turner II and Nixon concurrences, however, his Bartnicki concurrence articulated a wholly
different rationale and described the holding in different language from that of the opinion he claimed to join. Justice
Breyer characterized the Court's holding as "narrow" and limited to "the specific circumstances present here," namely
(1) the radio broadcasters acted lawfully (up to the time of final public
disclosure); and (2) the information publicized involved a matter of
unusual public concern, namely a threat of potential physical harm to
others. 136

Justice Breyer wrote his concurring opinion, he said, to explain
why he thought that the Court's holding did not imply a "significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media."'137
134. The statute did not actually punish receipt of illegally intercepted
communication, though it did punish disclosure of communications knowing
they had been illegally intercepted. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, "the law against interceptions, which the Court agrees is valid, would be
utterly ineffectual without these antidisclosure provisions." Id. at 551
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 534.
136. Id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens had not thought
it was the threat of potential physical harm that rendered the information a
matter of "unusual public concern." Id. at 536. Rather, he thought what mattered was that "[t]he months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public interest, and respondents were clearly engaged in
debate about that concern." Id. at 535.
137. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). An interesting aspect about
Breyer's opinion in Bartnicki is its several references to the "media." See, e.g.,
id. at 537-38, 540. This stands in contrast to Justice Stevens's insistence that
in answering the question whether the application of the wiretap statutes violates the First Amendment in Bartnicki "we draw no distinction between the
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Justice Breyer apparently read the wiretap statutes as an
exercise of the First Amendment's grant of power to the government, because he said the statutes served a First Amendment interest in "fostering private speech." 138 Accordingly, he
insisted that Bartnicki implicated "competing constitutional
concerns," 139 namely publication by "the media," on the one
hand, and personal privacy and the interest in fostering private
speech on the other. This reading embodied his rejection of the
negative conception of the First Amendment and his concomitant embrace of the view that the Amendment empowers government to "enhance private speech," which is what he said the
statutes at issue in Bartnicki did. 140 In addition, his concurrence provided him with another occasion to claim that, when
there are competing First Amendment interests "on both sides
of the equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit."141
The issue then becomes
whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead impose restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when
measured against their corresponding privacy and speech-related
benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent
of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to
2
secure those benefits?14

Assessing the factors he thought belonged in the scales,
Justice Breyer concluded that, although the wiretap statutes in
general had to be "tolerate [d] ,"' 143 as applied in Bartnicki, the
balance they struck was not reasonable. He appeared to harbor
no suspicion that either the wiretap statutes themselves or
their application in Bartnicki had been, or carried the risk of
having been, motivated by illicit government motives. He simply concluded that when weighing what he thought were the
relevant factors in the scales he supplied, the statute struck the
14 4
wrong balance.
media respondents and Yocum," the nonmedia respondent. Id. at 525 n.8.
138. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 537.
141. Id. at 536 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 537-38.
144. In his Madison Lecture, Justice Breyer described Bartnicki as exemplifying a kind of problem-the protection of privacy-and a kind of democratic process that "suggests a need for judicial ... modesty." Breyer, supra
note 8, at 263.
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A look at the factors that led Justice Breyer to his conclusion, and at how he went about assessing them, makes clear
that the process he envisions for resolving cases with First
Amendment interests on both sides entails a series of highly
idiosyncratic determinations about the nature and weight of
the statute's speech-restricting and speech-enhancing effects.
One aspect of his evaluation is particularly surprising in view
of the fact that the test he advocates specifically purports to be
about consequences: 145 his assessment of the balance struck by
the wiretap statute included no effort to assess the ex ante effects that the ex post decision not to punish the Bartnicki disclosures would have on the interest in fostering private speech
that he insisted the statutes served.
The first factor Justice Breyer weighed was that "the
broadcasters here engaged in no unlawful activity other than
the ultimate publication of the information another had previously obtained."'146 In other words, they engaged in no unlawful
activity other than the unlawful activity in which they engaged.
Second, he put in the balance the fact that "the speakers had
little or no legitimate interest in maintaining the privacy of the
1 47

particular conversation."'

The final factor that Justice Breyer weighed, and that lent
support to his conclusion that the statutes could not constitutionally apply to the facts before him, was that the speakers
in
were "limited public figures"'148 who had a "lesser interest 149
privacy than an individual engaged in purely private affairs."'
The implicit premise of this assertion is that public figures, and
presumably also public officials, forfeit some of the protection of
the wiretap statutes simply by virtue of being involved in pub145. See id. at 246-47 ("[Mly discussion will illustrate an approach to constitutional interpretation that places considerable weight upon consequences-consequences valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes.").
146. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring). The statutes,
however, embodied the legislative judgment that the expectation of privacy of
electronic communication is always legitimate unless the eavesdroppers follow
statutorily prescribed procedures. Justice Breyer cited authorities suggesting
that contexts exist in which there might be a privilege to report "threats to
public safety," but these authorities provide scant support for his reading of
the wiretap statute to incorporate such a privilege. Id. at 539.
147. Id. at 539. Note here that Justice Breyer referred not to the fact that
the conversation was about a matter of public interest-the fact that Justice
Stevens thought mattered-but rather to the fact that it raised a concern for
the safety of others.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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lic controversies and talking about them with one another over
the telephone. It is difficult to imagine why this is sound as a
policy matter, or how such a result could be regarded as a benefit of the decision to privilege the disclosure of the Bartnicki
conversation. The public's significant interest in public officials
speaking candidly and forthrightly with one another would be
ill served by making their phone conversations more vulnerable
to interception and disclosure than those of private citizens.
4. United States v. American Library Association
Finally, consider United States v. American Library Ass'n,
decided in 2003, after the Madison Lecture. 150 In this case, Justice Breyer again wrote a concurring opinion that reflected a
rationale different from the plurality's, although this time he
did not purport to "join" the plurality opinion. In American Library Ass'n, the Court sustained provisions of the Children's
Internet Protection Act (CIPA) that required public libraries
receiving federal funds to install software filters to block obscenity, child pornography, or other sexually explicit material
harmful to minors. To alleviate the phenomenon of overblocking-the filters wrongly block material and the technology does
not exist to make them perfectly accurate-CIPA permitted libraries to disable them for patrons who needed access for "bona
fide research or other lawful purposes."'151
In terms of existing doctrine, American Library Ass'n ought
to have been an easy case. 152 Framed as an issue about the limits of congressional spending power, it was governed by South
Dakota v. Dole.153 In Dole, the Court held that while Article I
did not limit Congress's ability to pursue national objectives
through conditional grants of federal funds, Congress could not
use its spending power to "induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional."'154 Applying
this limitation of congressional power to the statute at issue in
American Library Ass'n, the Court held that since Internet access in public libraries was neither a traditional nor a designated public forum, libraries could decide on their own to install filtering software without violating the First Amendment,
150.
151.

539 U.S. 194 (2003).
Id. at 201 (quoting 20 U.S.C.

§ 9134(f)(3);

47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D)).

152. See Lillian R. BeVier, United States v. American Library Association:
Whither FirstAmendment Doctrine, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 166.
153.

483 U.S. 203 (1987).

154.

Id. at 210.
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even if the software overblocked. The conclusion that libraries
were not public forums reflected the plurality's conviction that
"[t]o fulfill their traditional missions, public libraries must have
broad discretion to decide what material to provide to their patrons";15 5 the First Amendment did not require the Court to
second-guess libraries' decisions.
The troublesome fact in American Library Ass'n, of course,
was that many public libraries would have exercised their discretion by not installing filters, and it was public libraries that
challenged the statute. They argued that the filter installation
requirement imposed an unconstitutional condition on receipt
of federal funds and thus violated their constitutional rights,
not the rights of their patrons. Assuming arguendo that public
libraries have First Amendment rights despite being government entities, the plurality opinion dismissed the unconstitutional conditions argument on the merits citing Rust v. Sullivan.15 6 The Court insisted that CIPA did not penalize libraries
that did not install the blocking software; rather Congress had
merely decided to refuse to subsidize their decision not to do
SO.

15 7

The rationale of Justice Breyer's concurring opinion had
almost nothing in common with the plurality's. Eschewing both
strict scrutiny--"too limiting and rigid"' 5 -- and the genuine
deference to the judgment of others that is implicit in rational
basis review, Justice Breyer applied what he referred to as "a
form of heightened scrutiny, examining the statutory requirements in question with special care." 159 He neglected to specify
his views about either South Dakota v. Dole or the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and did not explain why he thought
these precedents were irrelevant. Claiming to rely on cases that
had emerged in different regulatory contexts and applied different doctrines from those that provided the plurality's analytical framework, 160 Justice Breyer said that CIPA should be
155. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 204 (2003).
156. See id. at 211-12.
157. See id. at 212.
158. Id. at 217 (Breyer, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 216.
160. As examples of cases in which "complex, competing constitutional interests are potentially at issue or speech-related harm is potentially justified
by unusually strong governmental interests... [where] [t]ypically the key
question... is one of proper fit," Id. at 217. Justice Breyer cited Board of
Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), a commercial speech case in which the Court was explicitly interpreting the Central
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examined as, he claimed,
the Court has examined speech-related restrictions in other contexts
where circumstances call for heightened, but not 'strict' scrutinywhere, for example, complex, competing constitutional interests are
potentially at issue or speech-related harm is potentially justified by
unusually strong governmental interests. Typically the key question
T
in such instances is one of proper fit. 16

The rhetorical work performed by the use of "typically" in
that last sentence was to imply that the decision-making proc-

ess Justice Breyer envisioned was no different from the process
that the Court had employed in the past. The process he went
on to describe, however, was not one that the Court itself had
ever deployed. 162 Instead, his methodology was almost identical

to the one he had advocated for cases in which he had found

6 3
First Amendment interests on both sides-Bartnicki,1
164
65
Turner, and Nixon1 -and his Madison Lecture.166 The process, he claimed, does not involve "balancing."167 Rather, it "supplements [strict scrutiny] with an approach that is more flexi-

ble but nonetheless provides the legislature with less than
ordinary leeway in light of the fact that constitutionally protected expression is at issue.' 168 Applying his approach, he deHudson requirement that government restrictions on commercial speech must
be no broader than necessary to make clear that this did not mean that the
regulation must use the least restrictive means. Id. at 477. He also cited his
own plurality opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), a case that concerned provisions of
the Cable TV Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 regarding
broadcast of sexually explicit programs; his partial concurrence in Turner II;
and Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the case that sustained the fairness and personal attack rules as applied to the broadcast context.
161. Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 217.
162. Justice Breyer stated:
In [cases in which constitutionally protected expression is at issue]
the Court has asked whether the harm to speech-related interests is
disproportionate in light of both the justifications and the potential
alternatives. It has considered the legitimacy of the statute's objective, the extent to which the statute will tend to achieve that objective, whether there are other, less restrictive ways of achieving that
objective, and ultimately whether the statute works speech-related
harm that, in relation to that objective, is out of proportion.
Id. at 217-18.
163. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
164. Turner H, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner I, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
165. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
166. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 250.
167. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 218.
168. Id.
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termined that CIPA satisfied the Constitution's demands. Although he voted to sustain the statute, it would be incorrect to
characterize him as deferring to Congress's judgment. Instead,
he simply agreed with it. Exercising his own judgment rather
than letting Congress decide in any genuine sense, he voted to
sustain the statute. Having compared the competing factors on
his personal scale of value, he could "[n]ot say that any speechrelated harm that the Act may cause is disproportionate16 9when
considered in relation to the Act's legitimate objectives."'
III. JUSTICE BREYER'S APPROACH: SOME
ANXIOUS THOUGHTS
Justice Breyer claimed in his Madison Lecture that his focus upon active liberty "embodies an understanding of the
judges' own expertise compared, for example, with that of a legislature."'170 He characterized himself as adopting an attitude of
judicial modesty, as being beset by "doubt, caution, prudence,
171
and concern-that state of not being 'too sure' of oneself,"' as
' 172 Commentators
embracing "traditional 'judicial restraint."
have taken his claims at face value. They describe his approach
1
as "minimalist,"'173 "restrained,"'

4

deferential to the judgments

175 and reflective
of other participants in public policy debates,
of the self-doubt of a Justice "who [is] not too sure [he is]
right."'176 Indeed, the conventional wisdom seems to be that
applies a "consisJustice Breyer entertains and commendably
177
tently modest view of judicial power."'
To test whether the conventional wisdom is correctwhether Justice Breyer can sustain the claim to judicial mod-

169. Id. at 220.
170. Breyer, supra note 8, at 250.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Linda Greenhouse, Between Certainty and Doubt: States of Mind
on the Supreme Court Today, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 241, 243 (2003) (contrasting the
jurisprudence of Justice Breyer, whom she describes as a "Justice of minimalism," with that of Justice Scalia, a "Justice of maximalism").
174. Jeffrey Rosen, Modest Proposal: Stephen Breyer Restrains Himself,
NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 2002, at 21 (describing the Madison Lecture as a
powerful case for "liberal judicial restraint").
175. Id. (referring credulously to Justice Breyer's "insistence that courts
should defer to Congress").
176. Greenhouse, supra note 173, at 6 (quoting SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at
259).
177. Rosen, supra note 174, at 25.
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esty which has won him considerable praise-we need a working definition of the term. Commentators and Justice Breyer
tend to equate judicial modesty with minimalism, restraint,
deference, and self-doubt. More particularly, they appear to regard two specific aspects of the Justice's decisions as evidence
of his modesty, namely the decisions' narrowness-their refusal
to be bound by past or to announce future bright-line rules 17 8and the fact that they would have upheld federal and state
regulations more often than those of any other Justice. 179 The
former exemplifies minimalism, the latter restraint, deference,
and self-doubt.
There is a problem with concluding that, because a Justice
often votes to sustain legislation or regulations, he is necessarily exhibiting deference to others' judgments. I suggest that deference to the judgment of another institution implies a genuine
bowing to its perceived comparative institutional advantage at
making particular kinds of decisions. Rational basis review is
deferential in this sense. One who defers to another's judgment
does not undertake a detailed reevaluation and reweighing of
the factors that produced it. If this is correct, Justice Breyer's
proportionality approach appears on its face to be the opposite
of a genuine commitment to defer to other branches. In its own
terms, the approach claims a judicial mandate not to accept but
to reweigh legislatively drawn balances, and to assess independently the kind, importance, and extent of a statute's benefits and compare them to the need for the restrictions it imposes.
Perhaps in application the proportionality approach would
result in the Court sustaining more statutes than, say, application of the compelling state interest test. This result, however,
would eventuate not because the test tells the Court to defer to
legislative judgments but because it permits it to agree with
them. Moreover, at least in the First Amendment cases considered in this Article, Justice Breyer's opinions do not exhibit
deference to others' judgments; rather, they disclose an instinct
to reweigh them and no apparent hesitation about overturning
them. In addition, the opinions' self-assured and confident tone
tends to belie the Justice's claims that he is beset by self-doubt
and uncertainty about the rightness of his judgments.

178. See Greenhouse, supra note 173, at 248-50.
179. See Rosen, supra note 174, at 22; see also Eugene Volokh, How the
Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1193-95 (2001).
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It is accurate to characterize Justice Breyer's approach as
180
and thus to call it
one that "leav[es] things undecided,"'
term. It "do[es] not
that
of
use
Sunstein's
Cass
in
minimalist
181
consequence
inevitable
The
decisions."'
subsequent
foreclose
and of
however,
decisions,
Breyer's
Justice
of
narrowness
the
of
options
Court's
the
preserve
to
is
rules,
specify
to
refusal
their
for the future and thus to maximize its discretion and its
power. In my view, this consequence renders problematic the
implicit equation of minimalism with a modest view of judicial
power. Consider what Justice Breyer's approach calls upon
judges to do. It calls upon them to decide each case in the particular way they think the proportionality calculus might require; it gives them a mandate to assess in each case whether
the particular statute at issue strikes a reasonable balance between speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences
or whether it causes disproportionate harm to speech-related
interests; and it assumes that judges possess the capacity to
make this assessment accurately despite the absence of any objective criteria to guide them in doing so. The claim of judicial
power and competence entailed in this approach, it seems to
me, cannot accurately be labeled modest, nor does it seem particularly minimal.
In my view, judicial modesty "involves a serious effort to
respect the boundaries on present action set by the past and
the future." 182 In terms of this definition, Justice Breyer cannot
claim to be a genuinely modest judge. He is certainly not deferential to past judicial decision makers. For one thing, his approach would almost completely remove "[the Court] from the
1 3
Second,
confines of existing First Amendment doctrine."'
enough,
be
would
weight
much
how
specify
though he does not
he is explicit that he thinks the Court "places too much weight"
on the boundaries set by the sources of authority to which the
Court has looked in the past, such as 'language, history, tradition and precedent." 184 Third, when he consults precedent, he is

180. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Paul B. Stephan, III, Judicial Modesty (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
183. Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First
Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer's New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH
J.L. REFoRM 817, 828 (1998).
184. Breyer, supra note 8, at 247.
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not scrupulous about describing earlier decisions or conscientiously joining issue with their implications.185
Justice Breyer's "willingness to throw out the past... implicitly licenses others to do the same." 18 6 Thus it has ominous
systemic implications. The Supreme Court "cannot put aside
the existing structure of doctrine"1 8 7 and dispense at will with
consulting the traditional sources of the Court's authority without "making clear that they and other judges can do so again,
converting their office into raw judicial power."1 88 This, however, is precisely what Justice Breyer does when he explicitly
detaches himself and the Court from both the traditional
sources of the Court's authority (because they place "too much
weight upon language, history, tradition, and precedent"'1 9)
and from the confines of existing doctrine.
In its own terms, Justice Breyer's approach imposes virtually no constraint on the Court's future decision making either.
His insistence that in future cases the Court must assess the
kind, importance, and extent of a statute's benefits, as well as
the need for the restrictions it imposes to determine whether
its benefits are proportionate to its harms, is equivalent to a
claim that the Court has essentially unbounded discretion and
that it is well-nigh omniscient. Apart from invoking the vague,
general, and undefined concepts of "participatory selfgovernment" and "active liberty," 190 Justice Breyer specifies no
criteria and provides neither conceptual nor theoretical guidance for performing the task of evaluating the kind, importance, and extent of a statute's benefits or the "need" for its restrictions. Yet this is precisely the task that he must believe

185. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
186. Stephan, supra note 182.
187. Id. It is, of course, not always either immodest or illegitimate for the
Court to "put aside the existing structure of doctrine." Though the Court has
said that special justification is needed to overrule constitutional precedent,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-75 (1989), it remains
true that stare decisis is not an unwavering command. How the Court should
proceed when it becomes convinced that a line of prior cases was wrongly decided is, however, a deeply puzzling question involving large theoretical issues
and profound practical ones. The blithe assertion that the Court has placed
"too much weight" on language, history, tradition, and precedent does little to
resolve the puzzle. Indeed, it begs the most important and the most difficult
question: How much is too much (and why)?
188. Stephan, supra note 182.
189. Breyer, supra note 8, at 247.
190. Id. at 252.
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the Court-and each of its members-is capable of performing,
and of performing well, in case after case, year after year.
If he were to try to specify criteria to guide the Court's
judgment, Justice Breyer would be unable to do so, for none exist. There is no metric by which to determine whether "some
lump of government interest 'weighs'

more ... than some

chunk of free speech right,"'191 or some statute's benefits are in
just the right proportion to the restrictions it imposes. 192 Insofar as it suggests that he possesses a recipe for determining the
right ratio of burdens to benefits, Justice Breyer's language of
proportionality "betrays a strange unreality ...[and its] rheto-

ric is a disguise."'193 In fact, were his approach to become the
Court's First Amendment methodology, it would portend the
regular exercise of quite arbitrary judicial power.
Paul Gewirtz has suggested that "Justice Breyer's balancing and proportionality analysis has a refreshing candor and
lucidity, and his very openness about the factors at work for
him is a constraint on subjectivity."'194 This assessment, I think,
mistakes Justice Breyer's elegance of exposition and his fluid,
confident style for objectivity of judgment. It would be Justice
Breyer, and he alone, who would decide for himself, by the light
of his own values (and every other Justice who would alone decide for him- or herself by the light of his or her own values),
what kinds of interests matter, what statutory benefits would
be generated, how important and extensive they would be, and
how great the need would be for a statute's restrictions-bound
by no external constraint and no principle any more determinate than his personal assessment of the proportionality of
benefits to burdens.
It is hard to see how "openness about the factors at work
for him" can reduce the fundamental and intractable subjectivity of such an approach. This is especially true when one remembers that, were the Court to adopt Justice Breyer's ap191. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing,1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 167-68.
192. For a thorough review of balancing (or any decision-making process
that purports to weigh the value of a constitutional right against a governmental interest whose weight is determined on an undisclosed scale) and its
implications for the role of the Court and the legitimacy of its decisions, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987).
193. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV.
767, 788-89 (2001).
194.

Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 139, 197.
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proach, all nine of the Justices would make their own subjective determination of the proportionality of statutes' benefits
and burdens. Not only would no guarantee exist that the Justices would reach consensus, the more likely scenario is that
there would be every bit as much-if not more-disagreement
among the Justices as currently exists. What one Justice would
regard as an acceptable proportion of burdens to benefits another would regard as far too lopsided, and so on and so on.
Justice Breyer seems to assume that a Court using his approach would consistently reach results with which he agreed,
but this outcome seems quite improbable, since his approach
neither specifies criteria by which judgments are to be made
nor does it include the requirement that only he gets to weigh
and measure the benefits and burdens.
At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to briefly-albeit in
a radically incomplete way-sketch a response to the likely argument that Justice Breyer's approach is no more "arbitrary" or
"immodest," nor does it claim more discretion for the Court,
than the present array of First Amendment doctrines. As we
are all too well aware, "the current doctrinal cacophony creates
remarkable leeway for choosing which doctrinal rule to apply
as well as what result to reach."'195 The right question to ask
about the current doctrinal cacophony, though, is not whether
it perfectly restrains judicial arbitrariness but whether it does
so to a greater and more reliable extent than would Justice
Breyer's approach.
One thing that can be said about current doctrine that
cannot be said about Justice Breyer's approach is that it "reflect[s] and crystallize[s our own country's] past experience."'196

195. Id.
196. Id. at 198. The bracketed reference in the quoted sentence is intended
to draw attention to the fact that Justice Breyer's proposed proportionality
approach deliberately invokes not only our own past experience but other democracies' present practices of judicial review. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2003) (acknowledging that the proportionality approach he advocates "is consistent with that of other constitutional courts facing similarly complex constitutional problems," and citing cases from the
European Court of Human Rights and Canada). For a discussion of some of
the issues raised when American courts rely on foreign sources to support
their decisions on domestic questions, see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Debate: The
Use of InternationalLaw in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY.
423 (2004), noting that reliance of foreign precedents may compromise judicial
decisions in the eyes of the American public and conflict with the history and
structure of our own Constitution. Wilkinson's article also raises questions
about which countries judges should look to, with regard to which issues.
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Moreover, the doctrinal cacophony does not present the Justices with wholly unrestricted choices, for the range of doctrines
that will apply in any given case is quite predictable and limited. In addition, present doctrine provides a framework within
which lawyers advise their clients and craft their arguments. It
specifies which facts are relevant, which arguments are likely
persuasive, and the precedents for which attorneys and judges
must account. It provides directions for the decisions of lower
197
courts, though admittedly not as much as they would like.
Further, because of stare decisis, the expectation is that the
Supreme Court will be bound by current doctrine too, at least
until they overrule or otherwise weaken it.
As outlined in Part I, the cacophony that characterizes present doctrine obscures some important and reliable consistencies that in their turn reflect discernible, articulable, and defensible rationales. These consistent aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence, which Justice Breyer has, for the most
part, explicitly disavowed, have the capacity to guide and constrain the Court to a far greater extent than would Justice
Breyer's open-ended search for "proportionality."
I close this Article by invoking the image that provided the
inspiration for its title. I trust you have been on a train sometime. The one I think of is the one heading out of Grand Central Station. When I emerge into the daylight and look out my
window, I always find the jumble of tracks amazing, and a little
scary-the way they seem to head in all directions and cross
and recross one another. Eventually, of course, they always sort
themselves out but I always wonder about how the switches
work and who's in charge of them. I find myself hoping that
whoever is in charge knows what he is doing-so that not only
my train but all the others that will emerge from that station
can get where we are supposed to be going. For me and all of
the other passengers to get where they want to go, the person
in charge has to pull just the right switch to set things on their
right course. So I conclude with a question: If the First
Amendment were on the tracks, and all nine Justices were deciding cases, each using Justice Breyer's approach, do you think
you would have any idea where the Amendment would be
headed? If so, are you certain that it would be headed in the direction that you think it ought to go?
197. Am. Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that decisions requiring multifactored analyses "give[ ] ... judges of the inferior federal courts fits").

